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To the President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
The General Accounting Office has made a review of the expedited 
signing of certain agreements under title I of the Agricultural Trade De­
velopment and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1691), commonly known 
as Public Law-480. This report presents our findings and conclusions 
based on this review. 
1A our review, we found that the Department of State and the Agency 
f6r International Development had made special efforts to ensure that 
agreements for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to the Re­
public 'of Korea and the Republic of China were signed on or before De­
cember 31, 1964. This enabled these countries to avoid the effect of 
newly enacted legislation which required recipient countries to pay for­
eign exchange costs of ocean freight, starting with agreements signed 
after that date. 
In enacting Public Law 88-638 on October 8, 1964, the Congress 
extended the effective date of the above requirement to those agreements 
signed on or after January 1, 1965, so that there would be no default on 
agreements previously entered into or a need for the United States to re­
negotiate agreements ready for signing when the legislation was enacted. 
The agreements we reviewed did not fall into either of these categories, 
Accordingly, it appears that the actions taken by the agencies to conclude 
these 'agreements before the effective date of this legislation were incon­
sistent with the reason given for granting the extension. 
We estimate that, by signing agreements with the two countries by 
December 31, 1964, the United States will pay several million dollars in 
additional dollar costs for ocean freight charges over what would have 
been paid had the agreements been signed on the following day--January 1, 
196 5--or thereafter. In the case of Korea, it is possible that additional 
economic assistance would have been needed in subsequent years to help 
B-158225 
meet these ocean freight costs. The Republic of China no longer receives 
economic assistance from the United States. 
Moreover, so as not to delay negotiations and thus jeopardize the 
conclusion of the agreement with the Republic of China by December 31, 
1964, the State Department and the Agency for International Development 
made a concession regarding another aspect of this transaction. This 
-concession was contrary to recommendations made by the Department of 
Agriculture designed to protect the commercial agricultural interest of 
this country. We estimate that this concession resulted in a reduction of 
as much as $2 million of commercial United States sales of wheat to the 
Republic of China during 1965. 
A s pointed out in the text of this report, the balance-of-payments 
position of the United States also was adversely affected as a result of 
expediting the signing of these agreements. 
In transmitting our report to responsible Government agencies for 
comment, we made several proposals which we believed would assist 
the agencies in evaluating more precisely the financial implications of 
actions taken primarily for reasons of foreign policy. The agencies, in 
commenting on these matters, advised us, in general, that they believed 
their actions had been in consonance with the spirit of the new legisla­
tive change and that current management concepts provided adequately 
for consideration of the financial implications of such actions. Our eval­
uation of these comments is included in the text of the report. 
This matter is being reported to the Congress because, as indi­
cated above, we believe that the actions of the State Department and the 
Agency for International Development were inconsistent with the reason 
given for extending the effective date of the ocean Ireighprovisions of 
Public Law 88-638 and that, as a result, the Government incurred addi­
tional costs and did not take advantage of an opportunity to improve the 
United States balance -of-payments position. 
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Copies of this report are being sent to the President of the 
United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of the Treasury; 
the Secretary of Agriculture; and the Administrator, Agency for 
International Development. 
Comptroller General 
of the United States 
-3­
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UNDER TITLE I
 
OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT
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(commonly known as Public Law 480)
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
 
The General Accounting Office has examined-into the circum­
stances surrounding the signing of agreements during December 1964
 
for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to certain coun­
tries under the provisions of title I of the Agricultural Trade De­
velopment and Assistance Act of 1954 (7 U.S.C. 1691), commonly
 
known as Public Law 480. Our inquiry was prompted by our concern
 
as to whether any of the unusually large number of agreements
 
signed immediately before the effective date of a change in Public
 
Law 480 were inconsistent with congressional intent and were con­
trary to the financial interests of the United States Government.
 
Our primary emphasis was on examining into matters apparently need­
ing attention and our review was confined to the circumstances sur­
rounding the signing of two of the largest agreements entered into
 
late in 1964. It was not intended to provide an overall evaluation
 
of title I program activities in the countries we reviewed.
 
Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act,
 
1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950
 
(31 U.S.C. 67). The scope of our review is described 6n page 35.
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Title I-of Public Law 480 authorizes the 'President to negoti­
ate -and-carry-out agreements-with friendly-nations providing for
 
the-sle -of surplus United States agricultural commodities and for
 
payment therefor-in the currency of the recipient country.
 
In-Executive t
'Order"10900'dated January 5, 1961, as amended,
 
the President delegated to the Department of Agriculture all the
 
authority vested'in him for administration of title I, Public
 
Law 480, with several exceptions. The principal functions'dele­
gated to other United States agencies are as follows:
 
Foreign policy and relations
 
1. All functions under the Act, however vested, delegated, or
 
assigned, have been made subject to the responsibilities of
 
the Secretary of State with respect to the foreign policy
 
of the United States as such policy relates to such func­
tions.
 
2. The functions of negotiating and entering into agreements
 
with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations
 
conferred upon the President by the act have been delegated
 
to the Secretary of State.
 
Uses of foreign currency proceeds
 
1. To the extent deemed necessary, the Director of the Bureau
 
of the Budget is responsible for fixing'the amounts of for­
eign currency sales proceeds to be used for the purposes
 
set forth in section 104, Public Law 480.
 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury has been authorized to pre­
scribe regulations governing the purchase, custody, de­
posit, transfer, and sale of foreign currencies received
 
under the act.
 
3. Specified Government agencies have been delegated the re­
sponsibility of carrying out the purposes described in the
 
lettered paragraphs of section 104 of the act, using the
 
foreign currencies made available under the act. The agen­
cies with delegated responsibilities consist of the
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Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, the De­
partment of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the Office
 
of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the United States Infor­
mation Agency, the National Science Foundation, and others.
 
Supervision and coordination
 
of program activities
 
At the time our review was performed, the Director of the Food
 
for Peace Program was responsible for the continuous supervi­
sion and coordination-of the functions delegated in the Execu­
tive order. 1 This authority, however, did not terminate any
 
delegation or other assignment of function made by other sec­
tions of the Executive order.
 
On August 2, 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture established a
 
committee within the Department, known as the Working Committee,
 
for the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities of the Depart­
ment under Public Law 480. The Working Committee consists of the
 
Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service (as Chairman); the Ad­
ministrator, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service;
 
the Administrator, Consumer and Marketing Service; the Administra­
tor, Economic Research Service; and the Executive Assistant to the
 
Secretary of Agriculture. The Committee reports to the Secretary
 
of Agriculture through the Assistant Secretary for International
 
Affairs. This Committee is responsible for recommending the com­
modities and maximum quantities of commodities which should be eli­
gible for programming under the various Public Law 480 programs,
 
including title I sales agreements, together with the names of the
 
countries eligible for programming. The Committee also makes
 
iExecutive Order 11252, dated October 20, 1965, transferred to the
 
Secretary of State all functions of the Director of the Food for
 
Peace Program, including these under Executive Order 10900, as
 
amended.
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recommend&tions on broad program aspects and day-to-day program
 
requirements.
 
Pursuant to the President's request for interagency coordina­
tion of day-to-day operations under the Act, the Secretary of Agri­
culture, on October 6, 1954, established the Interagency Staff Com­
mittee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ISa). The delegation re­
quired the ISC Chairman to make the fullest possible use of exist­
ing services and facilities of the Department and to rely upon the
 
advice of the Working Committee. The membership of ISC included
 
staff-level representatives of the following agencies vested with
 
responsibilities under the act: the Departments of Agriculture,
 
State, Treasury, Commerce, and Defense; the Agency for Interna­
tional Development (AID); the Office of Emergency Planning; the Bu­
reau of the Budget; and the United States Information Agency. Rep­
resentatives of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
 
and theOffice of the Director, Food for Peace, also attend the
 
meetings as observers. Additional representatives may be added by
 
the Chairman if he considers it desirable.
 
The responsibilities of ISC include the development and review
 
of programs, operations, and basic agreements to be negotiated un­
der title I. Although the ISC technically is advisory in nature,
 
as a practical matter its decisions largely determine the terms and
 
conditions of title I sales. However, any member'who is dissatis­
fied with a proposed policy, agreement, or operation may require
 
its submission to policy officials in interested agencies or de­
partments for resolution.
 
The ISC usually sends the agenda for the weekly meeting to
 
representatives of the member agencies 2 or 3 days prior to the
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meeting date to enable the agenciesconcerned to determine their
 
position on the matters on the agenda.
 
Utilizing the service and'experience of other agencies' repre­
sented on ISC, the Department of Agriculture takes the lead in the
 
development and review of proposed programs. -The Foreign Agricul­
tural Service prepares 'the proposed program for each'country; the­
negotiating instructions, and a draft sales agreement and submits
 
them to ISC for review and approval. .If all members agiee oh the
 
proposed program and the drafts of the negotiation instructions and
 
the sales agreement, the program is approved for negotiating. If
 
the Committee is in agreement on-the program but not on the cur­
rency uses, the program may be approved subject to the working out
 
and approval of the currency uses at a later date. If the Commit­
tee cannot agree on the program or currency uses, the matter is re­
ferred to a subcommittee or to a member agency for study and recom­
mendation at a later meeting. If the question is resolved satis-"
 
factorily, the Committee approves the program.
 
The minutes of the ISC meetings are distributed to all members
 
of ISC, to other agencies which may be interested in certain phases
 
of programs, and to all United States Embassies as guiding princi­
ples to be followed and as reflecting the position of the United
 
States Government.
 
The I5C must analyze each program proposal to see that the
 
program does not displace the usual marketings of the United
 
States, that it is consistent with United States foreign policy,
 
and that it is coordinated with foreign assistance and'other United
 
States programs. It determines the broad categories of uses of the
 
foreign currencies and applies any other title I criteria which
 
must be considered because of other programs.
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After ISC approves a proposed agreement, the Department of
 
State transmits final negotiating instructionsjto the United States
 
Embassy and formal negotiations are started with the foreign gov­
ernment. Any proposed modification of an approved sales agreement
 
must be submitted to ISC for approval before the sales agreement
 
can be modified. After the government-to-government agreement has
 
been signed, further operations relating to the program are per­
formed by the operating divisions of Foreign Agriculture Service
 
(FAS) and Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
 
(ASCS.)
 
A major cost element of the title I, Public Law 480, surplus
 
agricultural commodity program is that of ocean transportation.
 
The United States has financed a major portion of these costs, in
 
dollars; under title I sales agreements entered into since the in­
ception of the program in 1954. However, as the result of a legis­
lative change to Public Law 480--Public Law 88-638 enacted in Octo­
ber 1964--the recipient country is required to pay a major part
 
of the dollar costs for ocean transportation under agreements con­
cluded on or after January .1, 1965.
 
Fbrty-four agreements, or amendments to agreements, with an
 
export market value of approximately $1.1 billion, were entered
 
into with 27 countries during 1964. Of these, agreements to sell
 
agricultural commodities to eight countries under title I, Public
 
Law 480, were entered into during the last 10 days of 1964, just
 
before the new legislative requirement became effective, as shown
 
on the following page:
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Estimated 
Market ocean 
Date Total amount value of transportation 
Country signed of agreement commodities costs 
Korea 12-31-64 $ 45,000,000 $ 41-,130,000 $ 3,870,000 
Taiwan '12-31-64 18,550,000 16,030,000 2,520,000 
India 12-31-64 28,400,000 23,700,000 4,700,000 
Dahomey 
(note a) 12-31-64 269,000 244,000 25000
 
Iceland 12-30-64 900,000 800,000 100,000
 
Morocco 12-29-64 7,800,000 6,900,000 900,000.
 
Israel 12-22-64 17,400,000 15,800,000 1,600,000
 
Guinea 12-21-64 5,420,000 4,980;000 440,000
 
$123,739,000 $109,584,000 $14,155,000
 
aThis agreement, which was not implemented, was canceled-on'May 22,
 
1965.
 
Only two agreements were entered into during December'of the
 
preceding year.
 
A draft of our report was transmitted for comment to the De­
partments of State and Agriculture, the Agency for International
 
Development, and the Bureau of the Budget in May 1965. The agen­
cies' comments, and our evaluation thereof, are incorporated in the
 
various subsections of this report, where appropriate, and in a
 
separate section starting on page 26. Also, the pertinent texts
 
of the comments are included -hereinas appendixes. Certain com­
ments made by the State Department and AID, designated by them as
 
classified security information, have been deleted from the appen­
dix. These'deleted portions either are so stated as to be unclas­
sified and discussed in this report or are not, in our judgment,
 
directly pertinent to the specific matters discussed herein.
 
A list of the principal officials having responsibilities for
 
the matters discussed in this report is shown as appendix IV.
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FINDINGS
 
EXPEDITED SIGNING OF CERTAIN AGREEMENTS
 
UNDER TITLE I OF PUBLIC LAW 480
 
The Department of State and the Agency for International De­
velopment made .special.eff.or-ts to.ensure that agreements.-or the
 
sale of surplus agricultural commodities to the Republic of Korea
 
and.the Republic of China were signed on or before-December 31,
 
1964. This enabled these countries to avoid the effect of newly
 
.enacted legislation which required recipient.countries to pay a
 
greater share of the dollar costs of ocean freight, starting with
 
agreements signed after that date.
 
In enacting Public Law 88-638 on October 8, 1964, the Congress
 
extended the effective date of the above requirement to those
 
.%agreements signed on or after January 1, 1965, so that there would
 
be no default on agreements previously entered into or a need for
 
the -UnitedStates to renegotiate agreements ready for signing when
 
-the legislation was enacted. None of the agreements we reviewed
 
-- Accordingly, it appears that
fell into tither of these categories. 

th6 actions taken by the agencies to condlude these agreements were
 
inconsistent with the reason given for granting the extension.
 
We estimate that, by signing agreements with the two countries
 
by December 31, 1964, the United States will pay several million
 
dollars in.additional dollar costs for ocean freight charges over
 
what would have been paid had the agreements been signed on the
 
following day--January 1, 1965--or thereafter. In the case of
 
Korea, it is possible that additional economic assistance would
 
have been needed in subsequent years to help meet these ocean
 
freight costs. The Republic-ot China no longer receives economic
 
assistance from-the United States.
 
Moreover, so as not to delay negotiations and thus jeopardize
 
the conclusion of the agreement with the Republic'of China by
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December 31, 1964; the State Department and the Agency for Interna­
tional Development made a concession regarding another aspect of
 
this transaction. This concession was contrary to recommendations
 
made by the Department of Agriculture designed to protect the com­
mercial agricultural interests of this country. We estimate that
 
this concession resulted in a reduction of as much as $2 million of
 
commercial sales of wheat from the United States to the Republic of
 
China during 1965.
 
As pointed out in the text of this report, the balance-of­
payments position of the United States also was adversely affected
 
as a result of expediting the signing of these agreements.
 
In transmitting our report to responsible Government agencies
 
for comment, we made several proposals which we believed would as­
sist the agencies in evaluating more precisely the financial impli­
cations of actions taken primarily for reasons of foreign policy.
 
The agencies, in commenting on these matters, advised us in general
 
that they believed their actions had been in consonance with the
 
spirit of the new legislative change and that current management
 
concepts provided adequately for consideration of the financial im­
plications of such actions. Our evaluation of these comments is
 
included in the text of this report.
 
Amendment to Public Law 480
 
required foreign countries
 
to bear a greater share of
 
ocean freight dollar costs
 
As a result of an amendment to section 102 of Public Law 480
 
(Public Law 88-638, enacted October 8, 1964), a foreign country ob­
taining agricultural commodities under title I agreements entered
 
into after December 31, 1964, is required to pay in dollars for all
 
ocean transportation costs on United States-flag vessels, except
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for the cost differential involved in using United States-flag
 
1
 
vessels instead of foreign-flag vessels.
 
Under agreements signed on or before December 31, 1964, the
 
United States paid in dollars for all the ocean freight costs on
 
United States-flag vessels. The recipient country, however, reim­
bursed this country in its own currency in an amount equal to what
 
the cost would have been had a foreign-flag vessel been used. Un­
der the terms of the December 1964 sales agreements, most of this
 
currency was given back to Korea and Taiwan in the form of grants.
 
Essentially, the practical effect of the revision in the law
 
is to require the recipient country, rather than the United States,
 
to bear the dollar cost of ocean transportation on American vessels
 
up,to an amount equivalent to what it would have cost to ship on
 
foreign vessels.
 
Our review of the legislative history of the ocean freight
 
amendment disclosed that, as originally proposed, it was to become
 
effective upon enactment, which in this case would have been Octo­
ber 8, 1964. We noted further that the extension of its effective
 
date to January 1, 1965, was proposed by the Senate-House Confer­
ence Committee that considered the 1964 extension of, and amend­
ments to, Public Law 480. While the Committee's report of Septem­
ber 22, 1964 (H. Rept. 1897, 88th Cong., second sess.), itself
 
specified no reason for extending this amendment's effective date,
 
the reason provided during the Senate's consideration was:
 
"*** so that it will not require us to default on
 
agreements heretofore entered into or to renegotiate
 
1The use of United States-flag vessels is mandatory for transporta­
tion of at least 50 percent of the commodities under the terms of
 
the Cargo Preference Act of 1936 (46 U.S.C. 1241(b)).
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agreements now ready for signing.. ***" (Cong. Rec..,
 
p. 21878, Sept. 23, 1964.)
 
The agreements discussed in this report had not be~n "entered
 
into" at the time the Committee was considering the amendment or
 
at the time its report was issued. Neither were they then "ready
 
for signing," since final negotiating instructions, which are nec­
essary to open formal negotiations with title I recipients, were
 
not sent by the State Department to its embassies until De&em­
ber 24, 1964 (Taiwan), and December 28, 1964 (Korea). In fact,
 
Korea did not submit its request for a title I agreement tntil
 
September 22, 1964--the same day the Conference Committee submitted
 
this amendment for consideration by both Houses of the Congress.
 
The State Department and AID advised us that they did not feel
 
that the will of the Congress in enacting this amendment had been
 
circumvented by theft efforts to ensure that the agreements with
 
Korea and China were signed by December 31, 1964., This vieNv was
 
based upon their belief that the time lapse between enactment of
 
the amendment and its effective date permitted the signing of new
 
agreements not embodying its provisions. Moreover, the agencies
 
commented that it is not unusual for the Congress to provide an in­
terim period before major legislative changes become effective.
 
The Department of Agriculture advised us that it had examined
 
closely into the congressional intent behind the amendment and had
 
determined that'concluding the agreements before the end of calen­
dar year 1964 was appropriate within the terms of the congressional
 
action.
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Additional ocean freight dollar costs
 
Our review of title I agreements entered into with Korea and
 
Taiwan late in December 1964 showed that special efforts were made
 
by the State Department and AID to ensure that the agreements were
 
signed before the effective date of newly enacted legislation which
 
would have required these countries to pay additional dollar costs
 
for ocean freight.
 
Under the terms of the agreements signed in December 1964, the
 
United States Government would incur an estimated $4.8 million in
 
additional dollar costs for ocean freight charges (note a), as il­
lustrated below:
 
Total Korea Taiwan 
Estimated dollar costs to the 
United States, according to 
December sales agreements $6,390,000 $3,870,000 $2,520,000 
Less estimated dollar 
costs to the United 
States had sales agree­
ments been signed after 
December 1964 1,550,000 900,000 650,000 
$4.840.000a $2,970,000 $1.870.000 
aunder agreements signed with Korea and Taiwan, the United States
 
will be reimbursed in foreign currencies for the cost that would
 
have been incurred in shipping commodities on foreign-flag ves­
sels. This amounts to the equivalent of about $4.8 million. Of
 
this amount, the foreign currency equivalent of $1 million will be
 
available for United States uses and the balance will be granted
 
to Korea and Taiwan. To the extent that the portion set aside for
 
United States uses eventually substitutes for dollar expenditures
 
that would otherwise be made, this would offset the additional
 
United States dollar costs incurred in financing ocean freight
 
shipments discussed in this report.
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Since United States carriers normally would have been paid by
 
the foreign countries in dollars or other hard currencies, an op­
portunity to improve the United States balance-of-payments position
 
was lost by having the United States Government finance such
 
charges.
 
In evaluating the need to expedite the signing of agreements,
 
we noted that there was at least a 5- to 6-month supply of commod­
ities available to Korea and Taiwan at the time the agreements to
 
provide similar commodities were entered into in December 1964, as
 
follows:
 
On hand or Monthly 
Country and in supply consumption Supply 
commodity channels requirements (months) 
(thousands)
 
Korea:
 
Wheat (metric tons) 436 67, 6
 
Cotton (bales) 147 28 5
 
Taiwan:
 
Wheat (metric tons) 24 6
-,142 

We believe that from the foregoing it is evident that a delay
 
of 1 or 2 days in signing the agreements would have had no appre­
ciable effect on the availability of commodities for these coun­
tries.
 
The circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreements
 
are further described in the following sections of this report.
 
Korea
 
On September 22, 1964, the Korean Government submitted a re­
quest for a title I agreement for its calendar year 1965 needs.
 
The request was primarily for wheat and cotton.
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The Einbassy and the United States Operations Mission (USOM)
 
forwarded the request to Washington on October 14, 1964, and ex­
pressed their belief that it was premature and that the data sup­
porting it were inaccurate. They recommended that the request be
 
delayed until later in the year, pending a better assessment of Ko­
rea's 1965 needs.
 
From mid-October until the signing of the agreement on Decem­
ber 31, 1964, there was a steady interchange of cables and memo­
randa among interested United States agencies concerning this re­
quest. On the one hand, the State Department and AID recommended
 
approval by December 31, 1964, in order to relieve Korea of the ad­
ditional freight costs called for by the new legislation. On the
 
other hand, the Department of Agriculture opposed signing the
 
agreement by December 31, 1964, because there was no need for the
 
commodities at the time and because signing the agreement would ap­
pear to circumvent the intent of the new legislation. For example:
 
1. On November 23, 1964, the Embassy in Korea and USOM rec­
ommended that the agreement be signed before the end of the
 
year:
 
"*** particularly in view of [Korea's] interest
 
sign *** agreement prior end 1964 avoid addition FX
 
[foreign exchange] and L/C [local currency] burden
 
under new legislation."
 
2. On DecembeT 10, 1964, the Director of the Program Develop­
ment Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of
 
Agriculture, advised the Assistant Administrator for Export
 
Programs, FAS, that there was no urgency for a new Korea
 
title I agreement. He stated that sizable quantities of
 
wheat still to be shipped under prior agreements would pro­
vide significant inventories with which to start the new
 
year and that cotton was in plentiful supply in Korea. He
 
added:
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"Korea and AID want to sign before January 1 to
 
get financing of transportation."
 
3. Substantially the same positions were taken at the Inter­
agency Staff Committee meeting of December 10, 1964. State
 
Department representatives urged that the agreement be
 
signed before December 31, 1964. Department of Agriculture
 
representatives maintained that sufficient wheat and rice
 
were available under then current title I agreements. It
 
was also pointed out that signing before December 31 ap­
peared to be a circumvention of the new legislation regard­
ing recipients' payment of ocean transportation costs.
 
4. On December 15, 1964, the Associate Administrator, FAS,
 
stated that there was no urgency for signing the agreement
 
since adequate quantities of wheat and cotton were still
 
available under previous agreements. He nevertheless con­
curred in AID's view that signing it would place United
 
States negotiators in a more favorable position in dealing
 
with other economic matters in Korea.
 
5. During this period, State Department and AID memoranda to
 
the Department of Agriculture advocated concluding the
 
agreement prior to the end of December 1964 on the grounds
 
that it would be extremely important to United States ob­
jectives within that country to do so. These objectives.
 
were political in nature and did not bear on the specific
 
question of the shifting of ocean freight costs from the
 
United States to Korea. Also, the agencies discussed cer­
tain consequences (of a classified nature) that might re­
sult if the concluding of the agreement were delayed beyond
 
December 31, 1964.
 
The agreement was signed on December 31, 1964.
 
Although we are not in a position to evaluate the effect upon
 
United States objectives had the added cost of ocean freight fi­
nancing been shifted from the United States to Korea, we believe
 
that the preponderance of available evidence indicates that the
 
principal motivational factor of State and AID was to relieve the
 
Korean Government of the need to pay additional dollar costs of
 
ocean freight.
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Available-evidence also points to the fact that the signing of
 
this 'greement on an expedited basis was not predicated on any im­
mediate need for the commodities, as illustrated by a communication
 
from the Director of the AID Mission in Korea to AID/Washington in
 
December 1964. The Director pointed out that:
 
1. A bumper 1964 domestic grain crop contributed to the high­
est grain inventory ever held in Korea.
 
2. Korean-importers were evidencing a reluctance to finance
 
cotton imports, partly because of fully stocked inven­
tories.
 
Taiwan 
On June 29, 1964, Taiwan submitted its request for a title I
 
agreement, mainly for wheat. .The American Embassy forwarded the
 
request to Washington on July 24, 1964, with a favorable recommen­
dation, provided that certain modifications were made.
 
Records at the State Department and AID show that special ef­
forts were made by both agencies to have this agreement signed by
 
December 31, 1964. For example:
 
1. On November 4, 1964, AID/Washington cabled the American Em­
bassy in Taiwan that:
 
"If agreement signed prior to December 31, now
 
anticipate new legislative provisions for freight will
 
not be applicable .
 
2. On November 19, 1964, the Embassy advised the State Depart­
ment that:
 
"Essential PL 480 negotiating instructions be re­
ceived soonest in order conclude agreement prior
 
Dec 31."
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3. On December 4, 1964, AID/Washington protested proposed pro­
gram changes partially on the grounds that consultation
 
with Taiwan would:
 
"* delay signing agreements-beyond December 31
 
resulting additional cost to GRC [Government of the
 
Republic of China] about $2.0 million as new freight
 
regulations would apply."
 
4. On December 21, 1964, theAmerican Embassy protested to the
 
State -Department regarding the imposition of certain condis
 
tions in connection with the agreement. The Embassy added
 
that insistence on these conditions would:
 
"*** lfkey create grave difficulties in consum­
mating agreements prior Dec 31, 1964."
 
5. The Embassy, on December 23, 1964, again protested imposing
 
the conditions stating that:
 
"It is imperative that agreements be signed prior
 
to Dec 31 deadline."
 
As noted on pages 21 to 25, the sales conditions the Chinese
 
Government was asked to accept were less favorable to the United
 
States than those advocated by the Department of Agriculture as
 
necdssary to protect our commercial agricultural interests, and
 
they were modified at the request of the State Department and AID
 
in order to make the agreement more attractive to Taiwan so as to
 
ensure its being signed by December 31.
 
The title I agreement, as finalized, called for the sale of
 
about 215,000 metric tons of wheat and 635 metric tons of tobacco
 
during calendar year 1965. Our, review disclosed no immediate need
 
for these commodities at the time the agreement was signed. In
 
fact, the agreement apparently was entered into primarily to gen­
erate foreign currency proceeds for carrying out United States as­
sistance programs in the Republic of China, since it was recognized
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that the Republic could probably afford to buy on commercial terms
 
any commodities it needed. For example, in forwarding the coun­
try's request for a title I agreement to Washington on July 24,
 
1964, the American Embassy recognized that Taiwan's ample foreign
 
exchange resources militated against another sale for foreign cur­
rency. The proposed agreement, however, was supported by the Em­
bassy on the grounds that there was a need for foreign currency
 
proceeds to carry out military and economic programs in consonance
 
with United States foreign policy objectives.
 
Since foreign currency proceeds from the new agreement would
 
have been available for United States-supported programs even if
 
the agreements had been signed after December 31, 1964, it is evi­
dent that there was no urgent need to sign the agreement by that
 
date for this purpose alone.
 
In commenting on this aspect of our report draft, the State
 
Department, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget advised us that the
 
December 31, 1964, title I agreement with Taiwan was much more fa­
vorable than prior agreements had been since it also included pro­
visions for title IV sales repayable in dollars, thus representing
 
a major shift from title I sales that are repayable in local cur­
rency. Moreover, the agencies advised us that this agreement
 
called for Taiwan to purchase, on commercial terms, quantities of
 
agricultural commodities from the United States and other Free
 
World countries substantially greater than those required under
 
prior agreements. They estimated this increase to be about
 
$24 million over the 2-year life of the title I and title IV agree­
ments (calendar years 1964 and 1965), a substantial, but unspeci­
fied, share of which would be purchased from United States sources.
 
For these reasons, as well as for the accomplishment of
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United States foreign policy objectives, the agencies doncluded
 
their detailed comments on this aspect of our report draft by
 
stating:
 
'*** The report's criticism of State/A.I.D.'s de­
sire to include the relatively small concession of
 
50 percent ocean freight financing of $2.5 million for
 
a program which had been under tonsideration for
 
6 months, therefore, is surprising." (Emphasis added.)
 
While the terms of the December 31, 1964, agreement may be
 
more favorable than those obtained in prior agreements, it does not
 
seem that the United States concession on ocean freight financing
 
was a conditioh precedent to obtaining such terms. For example:
 
1. We could find no evidence, despite extensive inquiries,
 
that Taiwan requested this concession during the course of
 
any country-to-country negotiations, or even that State/AID
 
negotiators ever broached the subject to their Taiwanese
 
counterparts.
 
2. State/AID's response to our report draft made no mention of
 
any insistence by Taiwan on such a concession but rather
 
specifically stated that it was predicated upon
 
"State/A.I.D. s desire."
 
3. The circumstances surrounding the negotiations of the
 
agreement make it highly unlikely that the matter was ever
 
''
 offi&ially broached or discussed. For example, final ne­
gotiating instructions from the State Department to its Em­
bassy in Taiwan were not dispatched until December 24,
 
1964, and were silent on the subject of ocean freight.
 
This silence seems predicated on the objections raised by
 
State/AID pri'br to final-izing the instructions, which by
 
their own admission were based on their own desire rather
 
than on any objections by Taiwan.
 
Accordingly,,while it is possible that the terms of this
 
agreement were more favorable to the United States than previous
 
agreements had been, we find it surprising that State/AID would
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make special efforts to s1!gn it by December 31, 1964, thereby add­
in&-to the United States' doIlar costs of opean freight. As pre­
viously noted, we could not find any evidence that this was a nec­
essa concesionfor obtaining agreement to the pro.pased -sale or
 
to its terms.
 
In view of Taiwan's strong foreign exchange position, there
 
appears to have teen no overriding reason for having the United
 
States, rather than Taiwan, absorb additional dollar costs for
 
freight charges. With the help of substantial amounts of economic
 
assistance provided by the United States in the past, Taiwan is now
 
considered to be economically viable and is cited by AID as an out­
standing example of the success of our assistance program. The
 
strong economid position of Taiwan also has been recognized by the
 
Department of Agriculture, which, on August 11, 1964, and again on
 
March 22, 1965, classified its financial position as good--the same
 
adjective rating applied to such nations as Australia, Canada, Ja­
pan, and the United Kingdom.
 
The title I agreement was signed on December 31, 1964. Our
 
review of the minutes of the Interagency Staff Committee and dis-"
 
cussions with agency representatives-on that Committee showed that
 
no obj-ections were raised to the expediting of the conclusion of
 
this agreement.
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Decrease in commercial sales of wheat
 
to Taiwan because of expedited signing
 
of title I agreement
 
To avoid delays in negotiations that might jeopardize,the
 
signing of the title I agreement with Taiwan by December,31,r1964,­
the Department of State and AID made a concession regarding another
 
aspect of this agreement. This concession was contrary to recom­
mendations made by the Department of Agriculture designed to ,pro­
tect our commercial agricultural interests, and it could have re­
sulted in decreasing commercial dollar sales of wheat to Taiwan by
 
as much as $2 million during 1965.- Moreover, since these sales
 
would have been made for dollars or other hard currencies, an op­
portunity to improve the United States balance-of-payments position
 
by increasing our earnings of hard currency was not realized.
 
Wheat and rice are considered to be substitute commodities
 
from a nutritional standpoint, since both are considered to be
 
high-caloric energy foods. Nevertheless, while wheat is being pro?-,
 
vided to Taiwan on concessional sales terms, Taiwan is a signifi­
cant commercial exporter of rice. This seeming inconsistency has
 
been rationalized by United States agencies administering Public
 
Law 480 on the grounds that the quantities of rice Taiwan has ex­
ported-in the past would have been exported even in the absence of
 
Public Law 480 wheat shipments.,
 
In the calendar year 1965 title I agreement United States
 
agencies for the first time attempted to limit Taiwan's rice ex­
ports on the grounds that title I shipments of wheat would make ex­
ports of some of Taiwan's rice production possible. This action
 
was in line with established policy that Public Law 480 sales
 
should not result in increased country exports of the same or a
 
like commodity.
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The means for limiting Taiwan's exports of rice is technically
 
known as a "compensatory requirement." Under this arrangement, for
 
each ton of rice Taiwan exported in excess of 110,000 tons during
 
1965, it was required to purchase on commercial terms from the
 
United States an equal amount of wheat.
 
The dompensatory requirement is usually arrived at by consid­
ering the historical level of commodity exports of the country re­
ceiving Public Law 480 assistance and by adjusting this dath to
 
take into account population growth, increases in agricultural pro­
ductivity, and similar factors.
 
On the basis of these considerations, the Department of Agri­
culture advocated that the 1965 titie I agreement with Taiwan con­
tain a noncompensatory export level of 80,000 metric tons of rice.
 
This was predicated on the thesis that Taiwan's normal rice exports
 
would be at that level in the absence of a title I wheat program.
 
For aniy exports of rice over this level, an equal quantity of wheat
 
was to be purchased from United States commercial sources.
 
In reviewing correspondence and related documents concerning
 
this aspect of the agreement, we noted that State Department and
 
AID officials had advocated raising the proposed level because of
 
their concern that adherence to it would prolong negotiations on
 
the agreement and thus possibly prevent its being signed before
 
December 31, 1964.
 
For example, a few days before the agreement was signed, the
 
American Embassy cabled the State Department of its concern regard­
ing proposed restrictions in the agreement, including: ,
 
"*** added compensatory requirement that GRC import
 
wheat with its own foreign exchange ton-for-ton for each
 
ton of rice exports over 80,000 M.T. annually. *** recom­
mend you to use your efforts to see that *** compensatory
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requirement dropped. It is imperative that agreements
 
be signed prior to Dec 31 deadline."
 
This cable, which was sent on December 22, 1964, is illustra­
tive of several we noted which alluded to contemplated difficulties
 
in finalizing the agreement by December 31 if compensatory and
 
other requirements were not modified. On December 24, 1964, re­
vised instructions were sent to the Embassy allowing the noncompen­
satory export level to be raised from 80,000 metric tons, as pro­
,posed by the Department of Agriculture, to 110,000 metric tons, as
 
finally proposed by AID, and the agreement was signed December 31,
 
1964.
 
The agreement concluded with Taiwan reduced its obligation to
 
purchase wheat from United States commercial sources by as much as
 
30,000 metric tons during 1965. On the basis of an export market­
price of $69 per metric ton, as estimated by the Department of Ag­
riculture, the loss of United States commercial exports would
 
amount to as much as $2 million.
 
Our review of AID's data supporting its proposed 110,000
 
metric-ton level indicated that a fundamental factor had been over­
looked. Essentially, AID's position was that the Department of Ag­
riculture's 80,000 metric-ton level was based on an average of rice
 
exports over a 4-year period--1961 to 1964--and that this period
 
,was not representative since:
 
I. Two of these years--1961 and 1962--were particularly bad
 
barley crop years. This necessitated the use of exportable
 
rice to make up the barley shortage, and rice exports,were
 
therefore reduced.
 
2. A 10-year average--1 955 to 1964--was 110,000 metric tons
 
and was thus more representative.
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Information developed in our.analysis of Taiwan's grain im­
ports and exports indicates that rice exports have been histori­
cally supported at artificially high levels by United States con­
cessional wheat sales. For example, since at least 1957, the
 
United States (1) has provided Taiwan with over 200,000 metric tons
 
of wheat annually under title I and similar programs, (2) has given
 
Taiwan most of the local currency derived from the sale of this
 
wheat, and (3) has imposed no conditions on the sale of identical
 
or similar grains. Thus, Taiwan has been able to export rice with­
out limitation and to use essentially free United States wheat.
 
United States agencies, in connection with the December 1964 agree­
ment, for the first time undertook to remedy this condition in fu­
ture title I wheat sales by limiting the amount of rice that could
 
be exported.
 
Since Taiwan's rice exports have historically been influenced
 
by United States concessionary title I wheat sales, it seems that
 
any noncompensatory export level would constitute, in itself, a
 
concession by the United States. For example, A parallel condition
 
exists in Korea which also receives title I grains at the same time
 
that it exports rice. The December 1964 title I agreement with
 
that country provides that all KQreai rice exports be offset by
 
equivalent imports of wheat or barley from the United States and
 
that these compensatory purchases be made with Korea's own re­
sources.
 
From the foregoing example, we believe that it was incumbent
 
on United States agencies administering Public Law 480 activities
 
to attempt to obtain the maximum feasible level of compensatory
 
commercial imports of United States'wheat by Taiwan. We believe
 
also that a desire to relieve Taiwan of the financial burden
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resulting from the legislative change to Public Law 480 would not
 
be a valid reason for the reluctance of the Department of State and
 
AID to enter into negotiations for the compensatory level proposed
 
by the Department of Agriculture.
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Agency comments and our evaluation thereof
 
In addition to the comments of the agencies previously dis­
cussed, following are their more salient comments together with our 
,evaliat-on-thei66f. 
1. The agencies stated that, in view of the nature of
 
the United States aid commitment to Korea, the pay­
ment of ocean freight charges falls directly or in­
directly on the United States foreign assistance pro­
gram. Thus, the agencies felt that no cost reduction
 
to the United States would have resulted had the
 
agreement been concluded after December 31, 1964.
 
It is, of course, theoretically possible that an increased
 
need for United States assistance might result from having Korea
 
absorb additional freight costs. We do not feel, however, that
 
such a contingency is sufficient justification for concluding the
 
agreement under circumstances inconsistent with the purpose of ap­
plicable legislation, particularly since our review of the legis­
lative-history of the ocean freight amendment indicated an expecta­
tion by members of the Congress that the recipient, rather than the
 
United States, wouldpay such costs.
 
Rather, we believe that, if the agencies determine that such
 
additional assistance is needed, the most appropriate manner of ob­
taining the necessary funds is to submit a budget request to the
 
Congress for its.review and approval during the annual authoriza­
tion and appropriation process. Moreover, AID itself has recog­
nized that these costs are ineligible for financing under the for­
eign assistance program and should be borne by recipients. In this
 
respect, the Agency issued a directive--Manual Circular 10:46, ef­
fective July 19, 1965--which in pertinent part states:
 
"B. AID/W [AID/Washington] recognizes that this re­
quirement [for aid-receiving countries to pay ocean
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freight costs] will increase the balance of payments
 
burden of many AID recipient countries. This payment
 
requirement, like any other legitimate foreign exchange
 
need, will be taken fully into account in assessing the
 
level of any AID program assistance to the country.
 
However, dollar freight costs attributable to *** Fthis]
 
must be borne by the recipient country and such costs
 
are not eligible items for A.I.D. financing." (Emphasis
 
added.)
 
2. In the case of Korea, the agencies did not concur in
 
our view, expressed on page 13, as to the lack of
 
urgency for the principal commodities provided under
 
the agreement. State and AID advised us that they
 
normally regard a 6-month, rather than 5-month, pipe­
line as appropriate for cotton.
 
Assuming arguendo that there was an urgent need for cotton in
 
Korea, we believe it is evident that a delay of a day or two in
 
concluding the agreement would have had no appreciable effect upon
 
the availability of this commodity. However, the evidence dis­
closed from our examination strongly suggests that no urgent need
 
did, in fact, exist.
 
The Departments of State and Agriculture hnd the Agency for
 
International Development acknowledged in their responses to us
 
that substantial stocks of cotton were on hand or in transit at the
 
time the agreement was concluded. Thus, while the 5-month cotton
 
pipeline was perhaps 1 month short of what State and AID normally
 
,regard as "appropriate" for that commodity, it is evident that this
 
fact alone was not sufficient justification for concluding the
 
)agreement by December 31.
 
3. State/AID and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) indicated
 
that the decision that the United States relieve the
 
recipient countries of the dollar cost of shipping the
 
commodities on United States-flag vessels was made
 
after considering whether the agreements would other­
wise have been signed0 BOB added that this concession
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provided more leverage in negotiating better terms
 
elsewhere in the agreements. In the case of Korea,
 
State/AID and the Department of Agriculture advised
 
us that the title I proceeds available for United
 
States uses under this agreement rose by about $1.8
 
million when contrasted with the prior year's agree­
ment. The agencies compared this increase with the
 
$3.9 million provided Korea in ocean freight costs
 
financed by the United States. The Department of Ag­
riculture added that the $1.8 million represented
 
about half the additional freight costs paid by the
 
United States and also that this $1.8 million would
 
have an offsetting beneficial effect on the United
 
States balance of payments.
 
The agencies' inference that the countries would not have ac­
cepted the commodities had they been required to pay the added
 
ocean freight costs called for by the amendment seems to be based
 
upon speculative considerations. Extensive inquiries, which we
 
made at all appropriate agencies in Washington, were unable to pro­
vide us with any evidence that the matter of the concession had
 
ever been actively discussed with the recipients in the course of
 
country-to-country negotiations and was thus necessary to the con­
clusion of the agreements. For example, the negotiating instruc­
tions dispatched to the American Embassies concerned contained no
 
reference to any such contemplated concession. Rather, as noted
 
previously, the decision of the United States agencies, particu­
larly the State Department and AID, to grant this concession was
 
made prior to the dispatch of these instructions.
 
Moreover, it seems unreasonable for the agencies to have sup­
posed that the agreements would not be signed if the recipients had
 
to pay a larger portion of the dollar costs of ocean freight
 
charges. Title I sales by their very nature are extremely favor­
able to recipients, the so-called sales proceeds being payable in
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the recipients' own currency rather than in dollars. Moreover, the
 
greater part of such proceeds is not available for United States
 
use but rather is either granted or loaned to the recipients. It
 
seems highly unlikely, therefore, that commodities would be avail­
able to recipients under similar concessionary terms from other
 
,sources.
 
A practical illustration of the weakness in the agencies' ar­
gument is the currently contemplated agreement with Korea. In No­
vember 1965, Department of Agriculture officials advised us that
 
the Korean Government had requested a new title I agreement for
 
'commodities deliverable during calendar year 1966. Since the re­
quirements of the ocean freight amendment will apply to this con­
templated agreement, it seems obvious that the Korean Government is
 
seeking to obtain title I commodities under conditions requiring it
 
to pay dollar costs of ocean freight.
 
The agencies' comments regarding the increased.financial ben­
efits to the United States under the December 31, 1964, agreement
 
with Korea seem to imply also that the concession regarding ocean
 
freight costs was a condition precedent to obtaining Korean agree­
-,ment to an increased use by the United States of title I sales pro­
ceeds. Our review does not support this position.c Although there
 
-is some evidence that the Koreans were aware of the advantage to
 
them of concluding this agreement by December 31, 1964, we found no
 
evidence, despite inquiries at responsible agencies in Washington,
 
that this matter was actively pursued by United States representa­
'tives in the course of country-to-country negotiations. Moreover,
 
as noted above, it seemed that the agencies' decision to forego
 
ithis financial benefit to the United States was predicated on a de­
hcision of the State Department and AID preceding the opening of
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formal country-to-country negotiations and that it was not a con­
cession made in exchange for compensatory ones on the part of the
 
Koreans.
 
4. BOB advised us that, in connection with these agree­
ments, the decision to relieve the recipients of pay­
ing a portion of the ocean freight costs was made af­
ter taking balance-of-payment and budgetary consider­
ations fully into account.
 
After receipt of these comments, we inquired into whether a
 
special analysis had been made with respect to balance-of-payments
 
and budgetary considerations. A BOB representative informed us
 
that no specific cost analysis had been made. This representative
 
could not provide us with any documentary evidence as to what mat­
ters had been considered. We found no evidence at any of the other
 
agencies concerned that detailed consideration had been given to
 
the financial implications of the ocean freight amendment in terms
 
of the United States balance-of-payments situation or in terms of
 
budgetary costs to this country, so that an evaluation could be
 
made of the cost-effectiveness of such concessibns.
 
5. The Department of Agriculture stated that it is appro­
priate to sign agreements in advance of'the calendar
 
year and also that, from the standpoint of good man­
agement, it was considered desirable to have the
 
Korean agreement in effect by at least December 31,
 
1964.
 
We found that the preceding agreement with Korea, covering
 
calendar year 1964, was not signed in advance of the calendar year
 
but rather in March 1964. In many cases title I agreements are
 
signed during, rather than ii advance -of, the periods they are in,
 
tended to cover. Hence, there does not seem to be any inviolate
 
rule governing the concluding of agreements vis-a-vis the period to
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be covered. We always favor good management practices, but we can­
not perceive where a delay of 1 or 2 days in concluding a title I
 
agreement would adversely affect good management, particularly in
 
view of the precedent established by the signing of other title I
 
agreements, including the calendar year 1964 Korean agreement.
 
Also, since specific circumstances should govern any management de­
'cision, the overall lack of urgency for the commodities, coupled
 
with the financial advantages to the United States of concluding
 
the agreements after December 31, 1964, seems to us to have been
 
sufficient justification for cohcluding the agreements a day or two
 
later.
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Conclusions
 
The foregoing findings make it clear that the two Public Law
 
480, title I, agreements discussed in this report were entered into
 
under circumstances inconsistent with the reason given for extend­
ing the effective date of the ocean freight provisions of Public
 
Law 88-638 and that they were financially disadvantageous to the
 
United States.
 
It seems evident that these actions were directed principally
 
by the Department of State and AID, both to relieve the foreign
 
countries receiving title I commodities of foreign exchange costs
 
for ocean freight charges and to achieve certain foreign policy ob­
jectives. Other agencies represented on the Interagency Staff Com­
mittee acquiesced in these decisions.
 
We recognize that one of the objectives of Public Law 480 is
 
to serve as an instrument of United States foreign policy. Thus,
 
the Department of State and AID are properly concerned with the ad­
ministration of Public Law 480 programs in terms of their impact on
 
United States foreign economic and political policies. These agen­
cies, in carrying out their assigned functions, can be expected to
 
make full use of the opportunities presented by title I programs to
 
negotiate agreements with foreign countries under such terms as
 
will maximize their concept of United States foreign policy objec­
tives.
 
In our opinion, State and AID were the dominant agencies in
 
deciding when the title I agreements discussed in this report were
 
to be entered into with foreign governments. Our review did not
 
indicate that the influence of other agencies, whose interests in
 
Public Law 480 evolve around other than foreign policy considera­
tions, were brought to bear in the decision-making process so as to J
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permit evaluation of the financial-implications of entering into
 
the agreements on or before December 31, 1964.
 
The agencies which are concerned with both the budgetary ef­
fects and the balance-of-payments effects of the Public Law 480
 
program did not, as far as we were able to determine, make any
 
evaluation of the financial implications of concessions made to Ko­
rea and Taiwan and did not interpose any obj'ections to the position
 
of State and AID within the Interagency Staff Committee. Conse­
quently, we question whether administrative arrangements estab­
lished to coordinate Public Law 480 program activities are such as
 
to ensure that United States budgetary and balance-of-payments con­
siderations are given adequate weight in the Public Law 480
 
decision-making process.
 
We therefore suggested.to the Departments of State and Agri­
culture, the Agency for International Development, and the Bureau
 
of the Budget that it might be desirable for more specific review
 
and evaluation responsibilities to be delegated to agencies such as
 
the Bureau of the Budget. In response theret6, we were advised by
 
Agriculture and the Bureau of the Budget that representatives of
 
the Bureau and other agencies on the Interagency Staff Committee
 
are full-fledged members thereof, speak with an equal voice with
 
any other members of the Committee, and have adequate opportunity
 
to exercise their responsibilities. Hence, a more specific delegaz
 
tion of responsibilities was not considered necessary.
 
We agree that all agencies represented on the Interagency
 
Staff Committee technically have an adequate opportunity to exer­
cise their responsibilities. As illustrated by this report, how­
,ever, it is doubtful that sufficient facts were marshaled by all
 
\the agencies participating in the decision-making process to allow
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them to view-all of the implications -of.the decisions reached. As
 
a practical matter, the effectiveness of any committee in arriving
 
at balanced evaluations of proposed programs is dependent on the
 
degee to which the spokesmen of the various agencies exercise
 
their potential influence. We believe, therefore, that representa­
tives of agencies on the Interagency Staff Committee charged with
 
responsibility for evaluating the financial implications of pro­
posed agreements should make certain that such matters are thor­
oughly evaluated, particularly with respect to programs being jus­
tified on the basis of foreign policy considerations, and that
 
these evaluations are made a matter of record in Interagency Staff
 
Committee minutes. This would subject Department of State and AID
 
decisions in Public Law 480 matters to the discipline of a more
 
rigorous evaluation of their position in terms of cost-to the
 
United States when weighed against the specific foreign policy ob­
jectives being sought.
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SCOPE OF REVIEW
 
Our review was directed primarily toward evaluating the rea­
sons and need for entering into title I agreements late in December
 
1964. We made a detailed review of the circumstances surrounding
 
the signing of agreements with the Governments of the Republic of
 
Korea and the Republic of China.
 
We reviewed correspondence, reports, and other pertinent mate­
rial available to us at the Department of Agriculture, the Depart­
ment of State, and the Agency for International Development and
 
discussed relevant matters with responsible officials of these
 
agencies. Our review was conducted in Washington, D.C., and was
 
completed in November 1965.
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APPENDIX I 
Page I 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 
AGEN(CY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 
Wahinglon 25, D_ C. 
CONFIDENTIAL [Sen GAO note..J 
SEP 7 1965
 
Mr. Edward T. Johnson 
Associate Director 
International Operations Division 
U. S. General Accounting Office
 
Washington, D. C. 20548 
Dear Mr. JohnSon: 
The Agency has completed its review of the General Accounting
Office draft report entitled "Unnecessary Transportation Costs and Toss of 
Commercial Agricultural Sales Due to the Expedited Signing of Sales Agree­
ments Under Title I, Public Law 480." Oar review was made in coordination 
with the Departments of State, Agriculture, Treasury, and Bureau of the 
Budget. *** [See GAO note.] 
The amendment to Public Law 480, enacted October 8, 1964, 
stipulates that a foreign country purchasing commodities under Title I 
agreements entered into after December 31, 1964, is required to pay most 
transportation costs. We do not concur with the report that signing of 
Title I agreements in December 196k, circumvented the will of Congress. 
The signing did not violate the statute because a period of time from date 
of enactment through December 31, 196k, permitted the signing of new agree­
ments not embodying the revised transportation provision. When major 
amendments are made in legislation, it is not unusual for the Congress to 
provide an interim period before the changes go into effect. Also, from a 
timing standpoint, the Republic of China, [See GAO note.] 
had requested Title I commodities before the 
new legislation had been enacted; the Korean request was anticipated. 
In concluding that the U. S. -Government financed freight charges 
unnecessarily, the report assumes that the commodities would have moved in 
any case and ignores the fact that, so far as aid-receiving countries are 
concerned, the burden of financing freight charges falls directly or 
indirectly upon the U. S. aid program. For example, in connection with a 
Title I agreement signed with Morocco in April 1965, A.I.D. approved the use 
of Supporting Assistance loan funds to finance freight because of Morocco's 
stringent financial condition. 
COFFIDEMNTIAL [See GAO note.] 
w/attachments 
39
 
APPENDIX-Ir
 
-Page 2
 
Mr. Edward T. Johnson
 
The report states that the U. 2. will lose more than $2 million in 
commercial wheat sales to China because the U. S. Department of Agriculture's
 
initial -recommendation--on -the -amount- -of -rice-exports-, -for -which -off-setting­
purchases of wheat in the U. S. would be required, was not accepted. However, 
the report does not point -out that the usual marketings for all commodities 
.included in the Title I and IV agreements signed in December increased by 
about $24 million from previous levels. Moreover, the Title i .nd IV 
agreements signed with China accomplished a major shift from Title-I with 
payment in local currency to Title IV repayable in dollars at harder terms 
than previously. 
To the extent deemed necessary, I shall be pleased to arrange for 
conferences between members of our respective staffs to discuss the report
 
and our comments. 
Sincerely yours, 
Robert W. Herder
 
Acting Assistant Administrator for Administration 
Attachments [See GAO note.] 
GAO note: Portions deleted were confidential or were not pertinent tothis
 
report. 
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
F A FOREIGN-AGRICULTURAL-SERVICE 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250 
Mr. Joseph Lippman SEP 13 1965
 
Assistant Director
 
International Operations Division
 
General Accounting Office
 
Dear Mr. Lippman: 
Thank you for sending us copies of the draft of your proposed report to 
the..Congress on unnecessary transportation costs and-loss of commercial 
agricultural sales due to the expedited signing of sales agreements under 
Title I, Public Law 48o.. *** 
41
 
APPEND-IX II
 
Page 2
 
* * * * * [See GAO note.] 
As regards the countries described in some detail in the report as to their 
PL 480 agreements, the report notes that the request presented by Taiwan 
was communicated to Washington in July 1964. *** [ See GAO note] 
The American Embassy involved recommended favorable 
action [on the request. ] 
The situation as regards the Korean request is different from the others
 
mentioned in the report in that the U. S. Embassy as noted in the report
 
initially recommended in October 1964 that the request be delayed until
 
later in the year. The report notes that the Embassy recommended favor­
able action on the request towards the end of November 1964.
 
On the other hand the request was designed to meet wheat and cotton 
requirements for calendar year 1965 and it is appropriate to sign agree­
ments to meet calendar needs in advance of the beginning of the calendar 
year. It happened in the case of Korea that the Titie I agreement for
 
calendar year 1964 was not signed until March and was supplemented by 
additional'wheat in June. Therefore, Korea's immediate needs for wheat 
were not pressing. However, from the standpoint of good management it was 
desirable to have the agreement in eQfect prior to the beginning -of the 
calendar year. 
In addition, the general view was that it would be advantageous from the 
total standpoint of the U. S. financial support for Korea to sign the 
Title I agreement prior to January 1, since the ocean freight charges 
after January 1, would not be borne by Korea in view of its financial 
position and in view of the large scale aid commitment to Korea, but ould 
be financed out of U. S. foreign assistance to Korea either directly or 
indirectly. In other words, it was a question of whether the ocean freight 
charges on the PL 480 agreement would be financed out of the PL 480 
appropriation or out of the foreign assistance appropriation. It was felt
 
to be advantageous to continue to finance these charges out of the PL 480
 
appropriation. 
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An offsetting benefit to the U. S. balance of payments position was achieved
 
by an increase in the portion of the local currencies set aside for U. S. 
government uses to 19 percent. This amounted to a saving of $1.8 million 
in U. S. balance of payments which is about half the amount of loss estimated
 
in the report. 
In considering proposed agreements durifig the last part of 1964 we examined 
all proposals carefully in the light of what the law required as well as
 
our understanding of Congressional intent and made judgments as to whether 
their signature prior to the end of the calendar year was appropriate 
within the terms of the Congressional action. 
In addition, although the legislation did not provide a termination date
 
on the financing of ocean freight on the old terms for agreements entered
 
into prior to December 31, 1964, we voluntarily established such a
 
termination date as being December 31, 1965. For example, in the case of 
the three-year agreement with Colombia, which was signed on October 8, 1964 
and would therefore extend through the calendar year 1966, we judged
 
that it would be inappropriate to continue the financing of the ocean 
freight on the old basis for the entire period of the old agreement, al­
though it would have been possible in accordance with the law to do so.
 
We, therefore, provided that the financing on the old basis would extend
 
only through calendar year 1965. Also we determined that it would be 
inappropriate to consider Pakistan's request for a two-year agreement which
 
was presented in November 1964 with the obvious intention of having it
 
signed before December 31, 1964 in order to take advantage of the ocean 
freight provisions before the new provisions took effect.
 
We believe that the signing of the Title I agreements during the last 10
 
days of 1964 for the eight countries mentioned in their report was
 
appropriate within the terms of the Congressional action in all cases in
 
the light of total U. S. Government interest.
 
With regard to the recommendation of the report that the President consider
 
delegating more specific responsibilities to the Secretary of the Treasury
 
and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to give these officials an
 
enhanced role in the decision making process involving Public Law 480 
programs, we do feel that the representatives of the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on the Interagency 
Staff Committee are full fledged members speaking with equal voice with 
any members of the Committee.
 
As noted above, in the case of the Korean Government agreement it was the 
general feeling of agencies, including the Budget Bureau, that if the
 
ocean freight charges on U. S. flag vessels were not financed out of the
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PL 480 appropriation they would have to be financed out of the foreign aid 
appropriation,, given -the--large-U.- S. financial -commitment- to -the-Government --­
of Korea. Therefore, there vas -no objection on the part of these agencies 
to the expedited signing of the PL 480 agreement with Korea. 
This Department regards it as its responsibility to insure to the best of 
its ability that Public Law 480 programs are administered in accordance 
with the- intent of the Congress with particular attention to financial 
advantages to the United States. We therefore, welcome all measures which 
will enhance the administration of the program as so stated above by the 
draft report. 
Sinerely 
.yours, 
A I 
.y Raymond A. loanes 
Administrator
 
GAO note: Portions deleted were not pertinent to this report.
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
 
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
 
AUG 13 1965
 
Mr. Oye V. Stovall
 
Director
 
International Operations Division
 
United States General Accounting Office
 
Washington, D. C. 20548
 
Dear Mr. Stovall:
 
This is in response to Mr. Lippman's letter of May 26, 1965, to Kermit
 
Gordon, requesting the comments of the Bureau of the Budget on the draft
 
report entitled "Unnecessary Transportation Costs and Loss of Commercial
 
Agricultural Sales Due to the Expedited Signing of Sales Agreements under
 
Title I, Public Law 480.
 
We welcome your interest in this subject-, because we are actively con­
cerned with both the budgetary and the balance of payments. impact of the
 
P.L. 480 program. We feel, however, that full participation in the
 
deliberations of the Interagency Staff Committee provides us with
 
adequate opportunity to exercise our responsibilities in this regard
 
and that a more specific delegation of responsibility from the President,
 
as recommended in the draft report, is not necessary.
 
With particular reference to the cases cited in the report, the balance
 
of payments and budgetary costs were taken fully into account. The de­
cision that the United States should relieve the recipient countries of
 
part of the dollar cost of shipping commodities on U.S.-flag vessels was
 
made only after consideration of such offsetting factors as whether the
 
agreements would otherwise not have been signed and whether this provision
 
provided more leverage in negotiating better terms elsewhere in the agree­
ment. Most important is the fact that in.every case it probably would
 
have been necessary to meet the foreign exchange costs directly or
 
indirectly through our foreign aid program if they had not been met
 
through P.L. 480. For example, in the case of a Title I agreement signed
 
with Morocco in April of this year, the use of Supporting Assistance
 
funds to finance freight costs was authorized because of Morocco's
 
the cost to the United States would
financial difficulties. Thus, 

not have been reduced had signature of the agreements been postponed
 
until after December 31, 1964.
 
While the report correctly points out that the agreement with China
 
involves a non-compensatory export level higher than that originally
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fails to mention those, aspects
 
propOsed by the Oepartent of Agriculture, 
it 

the 480 program-in that .country 
were made con­
in b ich terms of out ?.L. 

siderably more stringent than they 'had been in- the past. l'ot only 'as
I, IRoe~ Yable in- localrom Titlethe frst time tha ,ere tncluded9....ag e m nthi r t at compensatory requirementsther1965 a re 

olr ta accelerated rate; "aria
 L....
the program, u there was a major shift frow Te -lo
~in the I af b t 
repsyable in dollars at an ae increased byby currency, to Title IV, 
n g 1 
the "usual marketil
requirements in these 
agreements was 
an estimated $24 million, 
of which the united 
States will receive 
a sub­
stantiSl share. 
.L. 480 agreements
 
We will continue to evaluate carefully all proposed 

ensure that they best serve total 
U.S. interest. We appreciate 
the
 
to 

opportunity to comment 
upon the draft GAO report 
on the subjbct.
 
Sincerely,
 
WILLIAM D. CAREY 
DirectorAssistantExect-ive 
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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS 
HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MATTERS 
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT 
Appointed or 
commissioned 
x 
SECRETARY OF STATE: 
Dean Rusk 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Jan. 1961 
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:-
Winthrop G. Brown 
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 
Aug. 1964 
Jerauld Wright June 1963 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVEOPMENT 
ADMINISTRATOR: 
David E. Bell Dec. 1962 
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 
Joel Bernstein 
OPERATIONS MISSION TO THE 
July 1964 
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT MISSION TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 
Howard L. Parsons (note a) July 1962 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE: 
Orville'L. Freeman Jan. 1961 
ADMINISTRATOR, FOREIGN 
Raymond A. loanes 
AGRICULTURE SERVICE: 
Apr. 1962 
a	Transferred on February 11, 1965, coincident with the phasing out
 
of the mission.
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